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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to estimate the impact of the Portuguese Minimum
Guaranteed Income Program (RMIG).  We estimate its impact on the distribution of
household incomes and poverty as well as the size of government expenditures
necessary to finance the program. The baseline adopted is constructed under the
assumption of no behavioural responses to the transfer mechanism and of total
participation of all eligible households. The simulation shows that 4,8% of domestic
households and 5,7% of the population are eligible to receive the RMIG. The Program
has a small but positive impact in reducing inequality. However, taking labour supply
effects into account results in a smaller gain in inequality reduction. Similarly, we have
a small but positive impact on the poverty rate for individuals. This gain, however, is
almost cancelled when labour supply reactions are taken into account. However the
most important consequences of the RMIG are sharp gains in the measures of poverty
severity and intensity. In these dimensions, taking into account the labour supply
incentives of the RMIG does not reduce substantially the positive impacts of the
Program.
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1. Introduction
In 1996 the government began experiments with localised introductions of a Minimum
Guaranteed Income Program (RMIG) in Portugal. After that experimental stage the
RMIG had its official beginning as a means-tested universal access program in late
1997.
The main objective of this paper is to present a study of the RMIG effects. We estimate
its impact on the distribution of household incomes and welfare as well as the size of
government expenditures necessary to finance the program.
The analysis will be carried out in three stages. In the first stage we use the 1995
Household Budgets Survey (HBS95) to establish a baseline. Initially we operationalize
basic concepts such as the definition of total household income, earnings, income from
capital, and government transfers. We also have to establish appropriate equivalence
scales. Finally, we estimate a central case poverty line, as well as a few alternatives to
this central case.
Once these steps are taken we target the individual distribution of equivalent income as
the basic object of analysis. We characterise the baseline scenario along several
dimensions: an array of inequality measures (Gini, Atkinson, and Generalised Entropy
(GE), these last two with several inequality aversion parameter values; an array of
Poverty Measures including the poverty rate, the poverty gap, and other Foster’s
measures (F).
In a second stage we introduce the parameters of the RMIG Law into a calculator that
maps household demographic characteristics and income (total and composition) into
transfers. Next, we simulate the distribution of income resulting from the program. This
is done under the assumption of no behavioural responses to the transfer mechanism and
of total participation of all eligible households. After this simulation is carried out, the
analysis proceeds in two directions. One is to characterise the resulting income
distribution exactly in the same way as we did in the first stage. Then, we can
systematically examine the differences in indicators of inequality and poverty. These
differences are our measures of the outcomes of the RMIG Program. The second
direction is to compute the total amount of transfers for the HBS95 sample and to infer
from this the total amount of public expenditures involved in the national
implementation of the RMIG program.
The third stage refines the analysis by considering the possibility of behavioural changes
induced by the transfers of the RMIG. Here, the analysis will be more tentative as there
is little information and scientific literature concerning labour supply in Portugal. The
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HBSs have only some information on labour market participation and no information at
all regarding hours or any other intensive margin measure of labour supply. In this
section we will combine information from the HBS database with the information from
empirical labour supply analyses performed for other countries to estimate the effects of
the RMIG on the labour supply of the households. We anticipate little or no response
from households with elderly or handicapped members, but we have very imprecise
priors on what the response sizes for other households might be.
2. The Departure point
In order to assess the impact of the introduction a Minimum Guaranteed Income
Program in Portugal we begin by an examination of the distribution of income and the
extent of inequality and poverty before the implementation of the Program.
The Household Budget Survey, conducted by the Portuguese Statistical Office (INE) in
1994/95, will be used as the base dataset to characterise the departure situation in
terms of income distribution.   It has a structure similar to the earlier HBSs studied in
Gouveia and Tavares (1995), Gouveia and Albuquerque (1994), Rodrigues
(1993,1994,1996), Costa (1994) and Ferreira (1992).
The sample consists of 8130 households which have been select in order to be
representative of the whole population.
The definition of disposable income used in this survey is very comprehensive: it
includes income from earnings, investment income, transfer and capital receipts, income
in kind as production for home consumption and imputed rents. Income is net of taxes
and of social security contributions. The OECD scale is used to deflate the household
incomes and to obtain the equivalent income of each individual in the household.(1).
The price level was updated to 1996, the year for the construction of the Baseline
Scenario and the departure point to all simulations.
Table 1 portrays the individual distribution of equivalent income by deciles. It presents
the mean income, decile shares and cumulative shares for each decile. The last column
shows the decile distribution expressed as percentages of the median income.
                                                
     (1) The equivalent scale recommended by the OECD is 1 for the first adult, 0.7 for other
adults and 0.5 for children aged less than 14.
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Table 1










1 358,30 0,03023 0,03023 38,19
2 528,36 0,04469 0,07492 56,31
3 652,14 0,05501 0,12992 69,51
4 759,38 0,06439 0,19432 80,94
5 876,36 0,07386 0,26817 93,40
6 1011,26 0,08576 0,35394 107,78
7 1170,21 0,09871 0,45265 124,72
8 1398,42 0,11825 0,57089 149,05
9 1807,95 0,15281 0,72371 192,69
10 3261,30 0,27629 1,00000 347,59
All 1170,95 124,80
Summary measures of inequality2 are presented in Table 2. The Gini Index shows a
value of 34.8%, a large number by comparison with other European countries.
Table 2
Portugal 1996 – Summary Measures of Inequality
Gini 0.34797
Atkinson (ε= 0.5) 0.09871
Atkinson (ε= 1) 0.18190
Atkinson  (ε=2) 0.31900
Entropy (α=0) 0.20077
Entropy (α=1) 0.21634
Finally table 3 summarises the findings regarding poverty using different poverty lines
computed as 40%, 50% and 60% of median income. Focusing on the 50% line, a
                                                
2 For detailed informations on these measures see Atkinson (1970,1983), Cowell (1981,1994)
or Lambert (1993).
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standard first proposed by Fuchs (1967), the table reveals that around 10% of the
population can be considered as poor.
Table 3
Portugal 1996 – Poverty Measures
% of the Median
40% 50% 60%
Poverty Line 375,54 469,43 563,31
F0 - Head Count 0,04823 0,10499 0,17523
F1 - Severity 0,01091 0,02367 0,04314
F2 - Intensity 0,00411 0,00873 0,01622
3. Methodology to build the different scenarios: The Baseline Scenario
The construction of the Baseline Scenario constitutes a decisive step in modelling the
impact of the introduction a Minimum Guaranteed Income Program. The main objective
is to try to reproduce the legal framework established by the Law that creates the
Program. It identifies the households that are eligible to receive the minimum income,
the amount of the subsidy that each household will receive and the total cost of the
Program.
The main stages in building the Baseline Scmnario can be synthesised as follows:
i) Construction of the equivalence scale underlying the RMIG legislation. The
equivalence scale established by the RMIG Law is very close to the OECD scale
but it weights differently the second adult in the household.
ii) Identification of the “minimum income” for each household in the dataset. This
basic income is computed multiplying the value of the Social Pension in 1996
(20000 escudos) by the number of equivalent adults (RMIG scale) existing in
each household;
iii) Construction of the “reference income” of each household. This is the income
that serves as a reference for the determination of the RMIG eligibility. The
reference income is obtained by the aggregation of all monetary sources of
income of the household but where only 80% of the wages and salaries are
included;
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iv) Identification of households that are eligible to receive the subsidy. Any
household whose reference income is less than its defined minimum income will
automatically be included in the Program;
v) Determination of the annual subsidy for each household in the program. The
subsidy that each household receives is equal to the difference between the
minimum income calculated for this household and its reference income;
vi) Construction of the post-transfer income distribution. This distribution is built
from the initial one by adding up the amount of the RMIG transfers to all eligible
households.
The Baseline Scenario is constructed under the assumption that there are no behavioural
responses to the transfer mechanism. The assessment of the impact of the RMIG will be
done by comparing the original distribution of income (pre-RMIG distribution) with the
one that results from the application of the Program (Post-RMIG distribution.
The differences between the two distributions, in terms of inequality and poverty, can be
interpreted as the outcome of the RMIG Program. This is done using the range of
methods and indicators of presentation of the distribution described in the previous
sections. The main questions that we try to answer are: who benefits the most from the
program, what are the costs associated with its implementation, what are its effects on
inequality and poverty.
Table 4 summarises the main macroeconomic outcomes of the application of the
program.  It shows that 4.8% of the total households and 5.7% of the total population
have an income low enough to be entitled to the RMIG. One first conclusion that we can
draw from the figures is that only half of the people in poverty (with the poverty line
established as 50% of the median income) will benefit from the program.
Table 4
Baseline Scenario – Macroeconomic Indicators
Household Participation Rate 150170 (4.8%)
Individual Participation Rate 533514 (5.7%)
Total Program Expenditure  (109 escudos) 30.575
Mean Household Transfer  ( 103 escudos ) 203.6
The program implies a public expenditure in transfers of 30.6 x 109 escudos (1996
prices). This amounts to 0.18% of the Portuguese 1996 GDP and 0.39% of the 1996
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total public expenditures3. The mean household transfer is 203.6 thousand escudos,
which represents an average increment of 18.5% in annual income of the households
involved in the program.
Table 5 gives us a first picture of the distributional effects of the RMIG transfers,
showing the households receiving these transfers where are located in the distribution.
The RMIG has an important effect over the share of total income detained by the first
decile that increases by more than 2 percentage points. After the fourth decile the effects
are not significant.
Table 5
Lorenz Curves  - Impact of the RMIG Program
Decile Pre-RMIG Post-RMIG Variation (%)
1 0.03023 0.03279 8.47%
2 0.07492 0.07782 3.88%
3 0.12992 0.13288 2.27%
4 0.19432 0.19700 1.38%
5 0.26817 0.27094 1.03%
6 0.35394 0.35611 0.61%
7 0.45265 0.45445 0.40%
8 0.57089 0.57264 0.31%
9 0.72371 0.72470 0.14%
10 1.00000 1.00000
Tables 6 and 7 illustrate the effectiveness of the RMIG as an instrument to reduce
inequality and poverty, as a factor to improve the well being of the population. Table 6
shows that the RMIG as a small but positive impact in inequality. All the indices present
a reduction of the inequality levels, but the indices that are relatively more sensitive to
changes at the bottom of the distribution register larger reductions.
                                                
3 Notice, however, that our estimates do not include the administrative costs of the program.
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Table 6
Inequality Measures - Impact of the RMIG Program
Pre-RMIG Post-RMIG Variation (%)
Gini 0.34797 0.34378 -1.20%
Atkinson (ε= 0.5) 0.09871 0.09568 -3.10%
Atkinson (ε= 1) 0.18190 0.17439 -4.13%
Atkinson  (ε=2) 0.31900 0.29545 -7.38%
Entropy (α=0) 0.20007 0.19163 -4.55%
Entropy (α=1) 0.21634 0.21137 -2.30%
The results of the application of the Guaranteed Minimum Income Program in terms of
reduction of poverty are displayed in table 7. Taking the poverty line defined as 50% of
the median income we find that the RMIG has a slight impact on the poverty rate.  This
is not an obvious result because the RMIG level per adult is about 52% of the poverty
line and thus one would not expect to have any households pushed above that line.
However, we have to keep in mind that the reference income used to define the income
transfers under the RMIG law does not coincide with our much more comprehensive
income definition. A result of this discrepancy is that some households with
comprehensive income close to the poverty line are nevertheless eligible to receive
transfers under RMIG, an event that explains the positive impact of the RMIG on the
poverty rate. The number of individuals on poverty reduces from 10,5% of the
population to 9,8%. Although this reduction seems very modest it implies that around
21000 households and more than 66000 persons leave poverty.
Table 7
Poverty Measures - Impact of the RMIG Program
Pre-RMIG Post-RMIG Variation (%)
Poverty Line (40% of Median Income) 375.54 375.54
F0 - Head Count 0.04823 0.03658 -24.15%
F1 Severity 0.01091 0.00464 -57.47%
F2 Intensity 0.00411 0.00086 -79.12%
Poverty Line (50% of Median Income) 469.43 469.43
F0 - Head Count 0.10499 0.09795 -6.71%
F1 Severity 0.02367 0.01702 -28.08%
F2 Intensity 0.00873 0.00428 -50.98%
Poverty Line (60% of Median Income) 563.31 563.31
F0 - Head Count 0.17523 0.17201 -1.84%
F1 Severity 0.04314 0.03667 -15.00%
F2 Intensity 0.01622 0.01111 -31.49%
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More significant than the reduction on the incidence of poverty are, however, the
alterations in the severity and in the intensity of the poverty4. The effectiveness of the
program in reducing the severity (F1) and the intensity (F2) of poverty are impressive
(respectively, 28% and 51%).  Those figures imply that the RMIG Program could have a
very positive effect in reducing situations of extreme poverty.
5. The RMIG and the Incentive Effects on Labour Supply
Introduction
The previous quantitative analysis on the implementation of the RMIG assumed the
program would not have a significant effect on economic behaviour. This section
presents a refinement of the analysis where we take predictable changes of behaviour
into account.
From an economic point of view the areas that may be considered more important
include labour supply5, the intensity of effort in job search, investment in human capital,
saving, risk taking, etc. Here, we will concentrate solely on what is arguably the most
important area: labour supply.
Ideally, the simulation of the changes of behaviour generated by the RMIG should be
made relying on a structural econometric model of labour supply. However, we resorted
to a less ambitious simulation methodology to create scenarios that captured the labour
supply reaction to the RMIG. This methodology rests in the parameterisation of labour
supply functions with estimates of the wage and exogenous income labour supply
elasticities. The key point is that the methodology used does not need any information
on hours of work, a feature required to use the household survey data since the survey
does not have information on any measure of labour supply such as hours per week or
even days per year.
The methodology also assumes that there is no rationing of labour supply on the demand
side of the labour market and that the RMIG does not modify the productivity of the
potential workers.
There is a question that is not dealt with in this paper. The RMIG may involve
mandatory work or training. Naturally, the idea is that these requirements both serve as a
screening device and as a forced investment in human capital that will facilitate an exit
                                                
4 For details on these measures see Sen (1979,1997), Foster J., Greer, J. and Thorbecke, E. (1984) or
Ravallion (1994).
5 On this, among many others, see Moffit (1992).
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out of poverty. However, in so far as these work and training requirements cause an
additional reduction in market labour supply the RMIG becomes a more expensive
program. In that sense the requirements will add to the disincentive effects generated by
the transfers and to lead to additional reductions in labour market effort.
The basic model
The specification starts with a standard linear regression explaining labour supply with
coefficients β and the following variables:
H hours worked
w, is the net wage rate
τ is the tax on wages
I exogenous income
X other relevant variables.
H I X= + + +β β ω β β0 1 2 3
From the previous equation we find the percentage change in labour supply due to net








where π1 is the wage elasticity and π2 is the exogenous income elasticity:
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where ye0 is the initial exogenous income of the household. The analysis maintains the
assumption that participation in the RMIG does not affect the gross wage rate in any
way, implying that the percentage change in total earnings is the same as in hours
worked.
 Killingsworth (1983, p. 119-125, p. 193-199, p. 202), shows that the estimates in the
literature vary greatly and that there is a systematic difference between men and women.
Thus, it is reasonable to admit that the uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply
is in the neighbourhood of 0,1- 0,2 for men and 0,3 - 0,4 for women. We will use
several assumptions but will consider a baseline scenario with an elasticity of 0.2. As for
the exogenous income elasticity, we have that the literature also displays reasonable
amplitude of estimates, again with a systematic difference between men and women.
We will perform simulations assuming alternative values for this parameter considering
a baseline of  - 0.15.6
One final issue that needs to be considered in the programming of the simulations is the
existence of incomes that are not considered as such by the rules of the RMIG. This is
the case of the implicit incomes in owner-imputed rents and production of foodstuffs for
own consumption. The handling given to these incomes in the modelling was to include
them as exogenous income relevant to determine the variation in labour supply but
obviously, not to include them in the computation of the RMIG for each family unit.
Non-convexities and endogenous program participation
 A last problem is modelling the participation in RMIG. It is obvious that households
with initial total incomes below the RMIG threshold are eligible to participate. It is
equally obvious that households with exogenous incomes above the RMIG will never be
eligible. The question is to what extent will households reduce their market labour
supply in order to become eligible to participate in the RMIG. An analytical handling of
this problem is not trivial.
                                                
6 The elasticities are needed to predict the changes in labour income of  all eligible households. These changes
depend on changes in hours but also of changes in effort intensity, types of jobs (less demanding jobs pay lower











Hausman (1980, 85) and others have shown that programs with a transfer/benefit
structure of the kind found in the RMIG generate a nonconvex budget restriction as
illustrated in Figure I. This nonconvexity increases the difficulty in modelling
participation in the program.
A lower limit on participation
The static participation case corresponds to assuming that the RMIG does not have any
effect on endogenous participation, i.e., that nobody with initial total income above the
RMIG decreases labour supply so as to become eligible. This case implies that the
participation rates will be minimal. In more formal terms, consider a household with
initial labour income yl0 and exogenous income y
e
0. The lower labour income limit for
non participation is yl0  * 0.2 + y
e
0 > RMIG, or
y  > 1.25* (RMIG -  y )  l 0 e0
Figure 1 illustrates a situation where this lower limit is not accurate. An individual in a
before RMIG situation chooses to work just enough to have an income equal to the
eligibility level. Given the existence of the RMIG she will chose to reduce hours of
work and become eligible to the program.
 Upper limit on participation
The maximum participation scenarios correspond to recomputing the labour incomes for
all those with exogenous income below the RMIG assuming that they participate in the
program. After this simulation of the impact of the RMIG on labour supply we verify if
14
the simulated total income is larger than the eligibility threshold given by the RMIG
plus 20% of these gross labour incomes of the work. If that is the case, then the
household does not have any advantage in participating in the RMIG, and our
calculations place it outside the program. Otherwise the household participates in the
RMIG.
Using equation (4) above we compute a percentile reduction of the worked hours ∆H/H.
The upper limit labour income for non-participation in RMIG, calculated for each
household in the database, is given by  (1+∆H/H) * yl0 + y
e




y  >   
1.25* (RMIG -  y )






If the participation condition is met, i.e. earnings are smaller than the threshold above,
the transfer T from the RMIG program to the household will be given by
T = Rmig - (0.8  ( 1+∆H/H) * yl0+ y
e
0).
This equation also applies to the previous scenario, but in that case only to those
households with earnings below the threshold defined for that case.
This second case errs on the other side of the previous case, setting thresholds too high
and inflating participation rates. Figure 2 shows that some households included in the
RMIG according to this rule would actually choose to be outside.7
An "ad hoc" intermediate participation estimate
It is easy to see that both the previous scenarios will err in their accounting for
participation in the program. The first sets a threshold too low, both in terms of income
and in terms of the implied participation rate. Clearly there will be households with
higher incomes that will choose to reduce labour income so as to benefit from the
program.
                                                
7 Graphs 1 and 2 show the same budget constraint but each set of indifference curves comes
from a different agent. The agent in Graph 2 has higher productivity. See Sadka (1976).
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Figure 2







A rigorous solution to the problem involves specifying a utility function and have the
choice formalised as picking the situation with the highest level of utility. That would
require information on wage rate and hours that is not available. The methodology we
ended up using has a "ad hoc" nature: we took the threshold level of labour income to be








+ 0.5  )y -(RMIG *1.25> y 0e0l .
In this scenario the transfers will be given by the same equation as in earlier scenarios
with the sole difference being that it only applies to households with incomes under the
threshold ab o v e.
The Results
Numerous scenarios were simulated taking into account a variety of values for the key
elasticity parameters and for the modelling of the participation decision. As one would
expect the amount spent in transfers and the participation rates of individuals and
households all increase the larger the elasticity parameters assumed. Simulations using
the upper limit on participation (not shown) have lower mean household transfers than
the other scenarios with behaviour changes because they place households in the
program that are closer to the eligibility income limits and that therefore receive small
transfers.
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Below, we report a selection of the results obtained with the intermediate assumptions
on participation. Occasionally we will make reference to results not shown for reasons
of space but available by request.
Table 8
Simulation with Incentives –Intermediate Level of  Participation
Baseline A B C D E
Wage Elasticity 0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.08
Exogenous Income  Elasticity 0 -0.15 -0.15 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
Total Program Expenditure  ( 109 escudos) 30.6 56.8 71.0 67.0 41.6 40.3
Household Participation  Rate  (%) 4.78 7.21 8.30 8.02 5.81 5.66
Individual Participation Rate (%) 5.67 8.87 10.20 9.88 7.01 6.83
Mean Household Transfer   (103 escudos ) 203.6 250.7 272.0 265.2 227.9 226.6
The results above show that direct expenditure and participation rates can double in the
scenarios with larger elasticities. Even in the more conservative cases the explicit
introduction of behaviour has sizeable effects.
Table 9 shows the impact of the program in a set of inequality indices. Including the
labour supply responses reduces the RMIG gains in inequality reduction by comparison
with estimates assuming no behavioural changes, but there is still a gain when the
comparison is made with reference to the no RMIG scenario. 8
Table 9
Incentives and Inequality Indices, Net Equivalent Incomes
Atkinson 0.5 Atkinson 1 Atkinson 2 Entropy 0 Entropy 1 Gini
No RMIG 0.0989 0.1822 0.3194 0.2012 0.2168 0.3483
Basic Scenario 0.0956 0.1744 0.2954 0.1916 0.2114 0.3438
A-Intermediate Participation 0.0970 0.1773 0.3020 0.1951 0.2137 0.3460
E- Intermediate Participation 0.9600 0.1751 0.2971 0.1925 0.2119 0.3444
                                                
8 Cases with large elasticities and upper limit participation levels have indices of
inequality that are larger with the RMIG than in the no RMIG case.
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Poverty measures respond in much the same way as inequality indexes, as Table 11
shows.
Table 10







No RMIG 0.1058 0.0238 0.0088
Basic Scenario 0.0980 0.0170 0.0043
A-Intermediate Participation 0.1047 0.0204 0.0055
E- Intermediate Participation 0.0987 0.0178 0.0046
Comparing the situation without RMIG and the simulations with intermediate
participation rates, there is a small reduction in the prevalence of poverty. One notices,
however, that the poverty rates were uniformly lower when incentive are ignored.
Simulations with larger elasticities and using the upper limit for participation show that
in such an extreme case the poverty rate can be even larger than in the no RMIG
scenario.
However, if the positive impact on poverty rates can be diminutive and in extreme cases
reversed the positive impact on severity (the poverty gap) is proportionally larger.
Finally, the impact on intensity is not only larger but also not reversed even in the most
extreme cases simulated.
These results legitimise a conclusion: the RMIG may not be very effective in
diminishing the number of the poor in Portugal, but it will certainly have a large and
positive impact in reducing the situations of extreme poverty.
6. Conclusions and suggestions for research
Main results
This paper reported exploratory work with the purpose of evaluating the impact of the
Portuguese Minimum Guaranteed Income program on the inequality of the income
distribution, on poverty levels and its consequences in terms of public expenditures.
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The baseline adopted to estimate the impact of the Guaranteed Minimum Income
(RMIG) is the distribution of the income in 1995 from the Household Budget Survey.
Estimates for a no-behaviour-changes scenario are that 4,8% of domestic households
and 5,7% of the people are eligible to receive the RMIG with a public expenditure in
transfers with the amount of 30.6 × 109 escudos (1996 prices).
The paper then deals with program induced changes in behaviour namely changes in
labour supply. A variety of cases are studied. In the simulation considered to be most
reliable results show that 7,2% of households and 8,9% of the people are eligible to
participate in the RMIG. If all the eligible households participate, the expenditure with
the transfers amounts to 56. 8 × 109 escudos.
 The Minimum Income Guaranteed program has a small but positive impact in reducing
inequality. Before the program the Gini of the individual distribution of equivalent
income is 0.348 and after the program it goes to 0.344 if no behavioural changes occur.
However, taking labour supply effects into account the gain in inequality reduction is
smaller and in the reference scenario the Gini reaches a value of 0.346. Similarly, we
have a small but positive impact in the poverty rate for individuals that goes from 10.6%
before RMIG to 9.8% after. This gain, however, is almost cancelled when labour supply
reactions are taken into account since the estimated rate after the RMIG becomes 10.5%.
Naturally, these weak results are linked to the difference between the estimated relative
poverty line (470 × 103 escudos) and the minimum guaranteed income proper, (240×
103). However, to evaluate the RMIG for its impact in the poverty rates alone is to lose
its most important positive impact. The most important consequences of the RMIG are
sharp gains in the measures of poverty severity and intensity (F1 and F2). In these
dimensions, despite somewhat lessened impacts, taking into account the labour supply
incentives of the RMIG do not reduce substantially the positive impacts.
Further research
The exploratory nature of this work revealed some areas where there are large gaps in
our knowledge that should be covered. This could be feasible as the administrative
records of the program and labour supply surveys become available to the research
community allowing for work as in Kershaw (1976,1977), Hausman and Wise (1985) or
Munell (1986).
The first gap relates to the “take-up” of the program. The quantitative analysis presented
assumed that all RMIG eligible households participate in the program and receive the
transfers specified. This is an approach that needs to be refined since the percentage of
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the eligible people that will in fact apply to the program will likely be significantly
below 100%.
The second gap is the absence of a structural econometric model for labour supply. If
the necessary data becomes available it will be possible to estimate such a model. Its
availability would help to perfect the estimates in this paper and permit a rigorous
analysis of policy changes, such as increasing the eligibility thresholds or lowering the
implicit marginal tax rates.
The third gap relates to dynamics. Ultimately, the goals of the RMIG program are not
only to alleviate poverty but also to help households escape from it. To look at this
question we need a dynamic analysis of how participation in the RMIG affects the
hazard rates of entry into poverty and exit from it.
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